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Abstract 
In South Africa, the legal and policy framework for land use planning and control 
underwent a significant transformation in which power over land use planning and 
control was shifted from provinces to local governments. This shift has taken over 
fifteen years to materialize as national and provincial governments resisted the 
devolution of authority. It was ultimately made inevitable by five Constitutional 
Court judgments in which local government asserted its authority. This article 
discusses the importance of the reform of planning laws in Africa and outlines key 
tenets of the recent reform. It discusses the devolution of planning powers to local 
government and the role played by the judiciary in unlocking the impasse. The 
central question is whether the court-led transformation of the planning sector was the 
appropriate mechanism for ushering in change. It is argued that the consequences 
of devolution for the planning sector in South Africa have been very significant and not 
all unreservedly positive. It is furthermore argued that the developments in South 
Africa are relevant for other countries on the continent, particularly as more and 
more countries constitutionally entrench devolution or decentralization programmes. 
 
Introduction: The Importance of (Changing) Planning Law in Africa 
Land use planning and control is essential to the role of cities and towns to shape the 
future of their communities. The law, underpinning this role, is equally important. In 
essence, “planning law determines which buildings are legal and which are not” 
(Berrisford, 2013: P 1). Planning law gives birth to planning instruments that shape 
economies and influence social and political life in cities and towns. They are adopted 
and implemented in order to mediate a range of different objectives. Firstly, planning 
instruments guide infrastructure development. New developments need to be connected 
to municipal services. Municipal governments must therefore be able to exercise some 
control over new infrastructure development in order to ensure that the infrastructure is 
included in the grid of municipal services (water, electricity, sanitation, road networks 
etc). The erection of new infrastructure without proper connection to municipal services 
leaves the users of such infrastructure deprived of essential services and is a recipe for 
underdevelopment and marginalization. Secondly, planning instruments contribute to 
certainty and predictability with regard to what will be permitted in a particular area and 
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thus attract and guide private sector investment. Thirdly, the protection of 
environmental resources is an increasingly important objective served by planning 
instruments. Land use planning documents and land use management decision 
making can be used to discourage or prohibit inappropriate development that will 
compromise environmental resources. Finally, planning is essential to mitigate 
environmental risks. For example, planning instruments can discourage or prohibit 
development in areas that are prone to fires, floods and other environmental disasters. 
They can also be used to mitigate climate change by encouraging densification or to adapt 
to climate change by insisting on coastal setbacks. 
 
The above mentioned objectives of planning apply in both a developed and a 
developing context. However, there are further objectives that are specific to the 
developing context. For example, given the high levels of informality and insecurity of 
tenure in urban settlements in African cities, planning laws and decisions can play a 
critical role in ending the exclusion of informal dwellers from urban management 
systems. If local governments could use their planning instruments to extend greater 
levels of tenure to informal dwellers, this could improve their connection to public 
services, their access to capital and make urban life more dignified and more predictable. 
Planning law systems have often failed to do so. The fact that the majority of urban areas 
in Africa develop informally has made ‘planned land’ a scarcity. This has driven up the 
price of the ‘planned land’. These land parcels are often held by powerful elites and in a 
scenario of collusion between elites and government, there is then little incentive to 
extend planning into informal areas. In addition, it is far too expensive for informal 
dwellers to comply with traditional planning regulations. Lastly, planning laws are often 
used against vulnerable groups (Berrisford, 2013). 
 
One would expect the above considerations to have permeated the laws that govern 
planning in Africa. However, this is not the case. These considerations and objectives 
are generally understated and underdeveloped in the laws governing planning in 
countries on the continent. There are two key reasons for this. Firstly, planning law in 
Africa often has deep roots in colonial law and, secondly, it has undergone surprisingly 
little transformation after the colonial powers left. The result, as argued by Berrisford 
(2013), is a planning regime that is essentially ill-suited for the African context. 
 
Planning law and the transformation of planning law is thus critically linked to issues 
of service delivery and development in African cities and towns. Consequently, it is 
imperative that planning laws are reformed in order to facilitate more effective urban 
management. In South Africa, the legal and policy framework for land use planning and 
control recently underwent a fundamental transformation. The most fundamental 
aspect of the reform was the devolution of planning powers to local government. 
Essentially, power over land use planning and control has shifted from provincial 
governments to local governments. While the Constitution ‘promised’ this reform as far 
as 1997, when the Constitution became operative, the reform took long to materialize 
as national and provincial governments resisted the devolution of authority. It was 
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ultimately made inevitable by five Constitutional Court judgments in which local 
government asserted its authority over planning matters. 
 
This article examines how this transformation was managed. It focuses in particular on 
the advantages and disadvantages of the courts being forced to take centre stage in that 
transformation. It uses the analysis of literature and law as its methodology. After 
examining the literature surrounding planning and local government, it examines, in 
particular, five judgments of the South African Constitutional Court. It is argued that the 
South African experience with a court-driven devolution of planning powers is 
relevant for other countries on the continent, particularly as more countries are 
implementing decentralization laws or even constitutionally entrenching devolution. 
 
The article proceeds with an overview of local government in South Africa. The 
overview comprises a brief examination of the legal framework as well as an assessment 
of progress to date in implementing this new framework. Subsequent to that, the article 
outlines the process of devolution of planning powers to local government. This 
devolution, and particularly the role of the judiciary in it, is assessed at the end of the 
article. 
 
Local Government in South Africa 
South Africa’s land mass spans 1,220,813 square kilometres inhabited by 52 million 
people. Yet the country has only 278 municipalities, making South Africa home to some 
of the world’s largest local governments in terms of both area and population. 
 
Before 1994, local government in South Africa was designed to implement apartheid. 
Local government institutions were racially determined and the black majority was 
denied democratic rights. White municipalities were self-serving entities; they were 
given exclusive power to tax properties in well-resourced and viable commercial 
centres without any obligation to use the revenue to improve the lives of township 
dwellers. Black municipalities were undemocratic and starved of income and authority. 
They became the subject of large scale service boycotts in the 1980s (Steytler & De 
Visser, 2007: 1-7; Ismail and Mpaisha, 1997).The 1993 Constitution introduced major 
reforms; local government was given constitutional recognition and various local 
government institutions were merged (Steytler & De Visser, 2007: 1-10). Even more 
fundamental change came with the 1996 Constitution, which further entrenched the role 
of local government. The new system was put into operation in 2000 and, at the time of 
writing it was thus only fifteen years old. It now comprises democratically elected 
political leadership with constitutionally guaranteed authority over functional areas. One 
of these areas is “municipal planning” (Schedule 4 Part B Constitution). The 
Constitution thus reserves executive authority over “municipal planning” for 
municipalities. As will become clear in this article, this is a critically important aspect 
of the constitutional framework for land use planning in South Africa. 
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The Constitution also secures local government’s authority with regard to certain 
important financial matters. It empowers municipalities to impose surcharges on fees for 
services provided and to impose property rates (s 229), and entitles local government to 
an ‘equitable’ share of nationally generated revenue (s 214). 
 
As an unequivocal response to the destructive role played by local government in the 
past, the Constitution posits local government as a sphere of government that is 
responsible for important developmental matters. The constitutional ‘objects of local 
government’ are to: - 
 
1. Provide democratic and accountable government for local communities; 
2. Ensure provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner; 
3. Promote social and economic development; 
4. Promote a safe and healthy environment; and 
5. Encourage the involvement of communities and community organizations in the 
matters of local government (s 152 Constitution). 
 
Municipalities are furthermore instructed to give priority to the basic needs of the 
community (s 153 Constitution). Municipalities are responsible for important services 
such as water and sanitation, municipal roads, refuse removal, electricity reticulation, 
environmental health services and the above-mentioned planning authority. 
Furthermore, they develop and maintain parks, recreational facilities, markets and local 
transport facilities. In addition to these constitutionally guaranteed functions, they often 
perform other functions including housing delivery, primary health care and community 
services such as libraries and museums. Taken together, these functions place local 
government at the epicentre of the much needed development in South Africa. 
 
The constitutional, statutory and policy framework for local government in South Africa 
is sound and the progress made to date is impressive. For example, access to 
electricity has increased by 10% since 2001, flush toilets by 6% and water by 4% 
(Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, 2009: 34). However, 
municipalities are fighting huge service delivery backlogs on the basis of a precarious 
financial position. Communication and accountability relationships with communities 
are often poor and many municipalities experience internal governance problems and 
sometimes even corruption and fraud (Department of Cooperative Governance and 
Traditional Affairs, 2009). Financial management is too often inadequate, resulting in 
negative audit opinions issued by the Auditor-General. In September 2014 the Minister 
of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, Pravin Gordhan, divided 
municipalities into three groups: a third of the municipalities were carrying out their 
tasks adequately; a third was just managing; and the last third was “frankly 
dysfunctional” (Ministry of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, 2014). 
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A significant part of these problems are caused by a crippling scarcity of skills in 
engineering and financial management but also in the field of planning (Abrahams & 
Berrisford, 2012) In 2010, Steytler and Powell (2010: P159) commented as follows: 
 
[T]he municipal system is … beset with several problems: Corruption and rent- seeking 
are widespread, if not endemic to local government. The technical and managerial 
base is thin. Assets are wasting as a result of poor maintenance. And funding is 
inadequate for local government to meet its constitutional mandate of providing basic 
municipal services. It is estimated that addressing the existing infrastructure backlogs 
by 2014 will cost almost the entire country’s annual budget. 
 
Communities across South Africa are dissatisfied with the progress made in local 
government. The image of communities protesting against municipalities has become a 
common occurrence. Recent research indicates that, from 2007 to 2014, the annual 
number of protests in municipalities never came far below 100, with 2014 recording an 
number of protests in municipalities never came far below 100, with 2014 recording an 
all-time high of 218 protests. Not only is the number of protests on the increase, they are 
also becoming more violent, with 83% of protests turning violent in 2014 (Powell, 
O’Donovan & De Visser, 2014: 3 and 5). With more than 50% of the grievances 
recorded in these protests relating directly to local government (Powell, O’Donovan & 
De Visser, 2014), it is clear that local government is experiencing serious challenges. 
 
The Devolution of Planning to Local Government  
Definitions 
Before outlining the devolution of planning powers to local government, it is useful to 
define two key terms that will be used often in this article. They relate to two distinct 
components of the broader spatial planning concept as it is applied in South Africa. The 
definitions put forward here are thus working definitions. However, the function and 
objective of the two components is likely to resonate in other jurisdictions too. The first 
concept is land use planning. In South Africa, this refers to the adoption of spatial plans 
that articulate a spatial vision for a specific area. Section 12(1) of South Africa’s new 
Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act 13 of 2013 (SPLUMA), which will be 
discussed below, defines a spatial development framework as a framework that 
interprets and represents the spatial development vision of the responsible level of 
government. These plans generally do not confer any specific land use rights to anyone 
but indicate broadly where government envisages development to take place and what 
type of development that may be. In South Africa, these plans are called ‘spatial 
development frameworks’. They can, for example, be compared to the ‘master plans’ 
that are common in other jurisdictions. The second concept is land use management 
and it is distinct from land use planning. In South Africa, land use management refers 
to the conferring of land use rights to individual land owners or users. Section 1 of 
SPLUMA defines land use management as “the system of regulating and managing 
land use and conferring land use rights through the use of schemes and land 
development procedures”. For example, the allocation of a specific zoning to a land 
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unit or the alteration of that zoning would determine what the land may be used for 
(i.e. residential, business, industrial etc.). Similarly, the decision to allow the subdivision 
of one land unit into two or more land units also confers specific land use rights to the 
owners of those land units. This may be compared to town planning schemes, zoning 
schemes or land use schemes. 
 
Planning Law before the 1996 Constitution 
Ever since the South Africa Act of 1909 which brought the former British colonies 
together into the Union of South Africa, and throughout the periods of the Constitutions 
of 1961 and 1983, South Africa’s provinces were firmly in charge of the regulation of 
‘town and regional planning’. The position at the beginning of the 1990s was thus one 
of planning law reflected in provincial laws (‘the Ordinances’). This at least was the 
position in the formerly white areas of the country. Provincial governments not only 
were the source of most law regarding planning, they were also the administrators and 
thus took most planning decisions. Gradually, local governments were ‘authorised’ to 
take certain planning decisions. However, the pace of decentralization was carefully 
controlled and tutelage over local governments firmly in place. In the former homelands 
and bantustans there were ‘national’ planning laws and regulations. 
 
Planning Under the 1996 Constitution 
The 1996 Constitution changed this and brought the new democratic local government 
system prominently into the picture. There were a number of drivers for this. First, the 
African National Congress and other liberation movements opposed the creation of 
strong provinces, which were favoured by other parties to the negotiating table, in 
particular the outgoing National Party government and the Inkatha Freedom Party. 
This undoubtedly influenced the decision to empower local governments in the post- 
apartheid dispensation (De Visser, 2005: 66). The Constitution therefore ended the 
provincial monopoly over planning authority and signalled the empowerment of local 
authorities by allocating planning powers there. It was going to take a long time, though, 
before this constitutional change was implemented. 
 
In distributing planning authority across the three levels (or ‘spheres’) of government, 
the 1996 Constitution uses no fewer than five constitutional powers that either 
directly refer to land use or have a significant impact on it. The Constitution 
distributes these over all three spheres of government. Firstly, the Constitution lists 
“municipal planning” as a municipal competence. This means that local governments 
have authority to legislate and administer municipal planning and that national 
and provincial governments have limited oversight powers with regard to “municipal 
planning”. Secondly, “provincial planning” is listed by the Constitution as an exclusive 
provincial competence. Provincial governments may legislate and administer provincial 
planning. Thirdly, “urban and rural development” is a power shared by national and 
provincial governments. Both may legislate and administer urban and rural 
development. Should conflicts arise, they are ultimately resolved by the courts. Fourthly, 
“regional planning and development” is also a power shared by national and provincial 
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governments. In addition to the above four planning related powers, the power to 
legislate and administer “environment” deserves mention. Again, the Constitution 
allocates this to national and provincial governments concurrently (see also Van Wyk: 
2012). 
 
1996-2010: An Uncertain Planning Framework 
While government intended to transform the planning framework to achieve the 
objectives mentioned at the beginning of this article, this complex intergovernmental 
arrangement has had a paralysing effect on government’s efforts to transform (Abrahams 
& Berrisford, 2012: 16). Government really only mustered two legislative measures on 
planning with significant transformative impact. The first was the Development 
Facilitation Act of 1995 and the second one was the Municipal Systems Act of 2000. 
 
In 1995, shortly before the adoption of the 1996 Constitution, Parliament passed the 
Development Facilitation Act (DFA). It was adopted shortly after the first democratic 
elections and was designed to facilitate the implementation of the Reconstruction 
and Development Programme (RDP), the incoming ANC government’s ambitious and 
progressive plan to roll out pro-poor infrastructure development. The 
DFA provided, amongst other things, for a far-reaching and progressive set of general 
principles for land development and the establishment of an inclusive Development 
Tribunal for each province. The Act was intended to be a temporary stop-gap, pending 
the enactment of comprehensive land use legislation that would rationalize the existing 
laws. However, over time it assumed “a measure of permanency” mostly as a result of 
the absence of an alternative (Berrisford & Kihato, 2008; 381). The Act was 
controversial in local government circles as it essentially placed the power to approve 
developments in the hands of provincial planning tribunals, albeit with local government 
representation. 
 
In 2000, government introduced legislation regulating integrated development 
planning by municipalities. In the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 
2000, municipalities were instructed to produce and annually review Integrated 
Development Plans (IDPs) intended to be the building blocks for the  entire 
government’s service delivery and infrastructure planning. These IDPs must include a 
so-called ‘spatial development framework’ in which the municipality expresses a spatial 
vision for the municipal area. The 1996 Constitution suggested a strong role for 
municipalities and close cooperation between national and provincial governments. The 
Municipal Systems Act took its cue from this constitutional imperative and implemented 
this vision. However, it only did so with respect to land use planning, i.e. the formulation 
of these so-called spatial development frameworks with a spatial vision for the 
municipal area. The rest of the statutory framework, dealing with land use management 
remained at odds with this constitutional vision and limped along on the basis of 
dated provincial ordinances and the Development Facilitation Act (Abrahams & 
Berrisford, 2012: 9). No national planning would see the light of day between 1996 & 
2013. In the meantime, the four provincial ordinances continued to  place land use 
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management decision making in provincial governments, contrary to the constitutional 
vision of local governments responsible for “municipal planning”. Some provincial 
governments, particularly those with a longer history of local government would 
authorize municipalities to take decisions and thus gradually commence the devolution 
of planning authority. However, the provincial tutelage remained and municipal 
decisions could be overturned by provinces. The Ordinances did not apply to former 
homelands and self- governing territories so a parallel planning system applied there. 
In between, and among all of this, was the Development Facilitation Act which placed 
parallel decision making power in provincial tribunals. 
 
The planning framework was therefore highly fragmented and uncertain. This 
thwarted the transformative potential of land use planning and land use management 
and also preserved unjust planning laws. As Abrahams and Berrisford (2012: 22) 
comment: “areas in which Blacks traditionally have lived are governed by the 
planning laws designed for those areas by the apartheid government, while the same 
applies to the areas in which Whites lived under apartheid. This is not only hugely 
inefficient … but also patently inequitable”. 
 
Cities did not feel sufficiently empowered to take bold steps in land use planning and 
management because they dubiously shared authority with provincial governments. 
For a variety  of institutional  and political  reasons, the national  government proved 
unable to take the lead in establishing a progressive new land use planning framework 
that recognized the constitutional role for local government. 
 
The Courts Step in 
In June 2010 this impasse was finally broken by a decision of the Constitutional Court. 
In subsequent years, a further four Constitutional Court decisions provided further 
clarity on the division of responsibilities between national, provincial and local 
government. 
 
The first judgment was City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng 
Development Tribunal 2010 (9) BCLR 859 (CC). It concerned a case between the City 
of Johannesburg and the province of Gauteng’s Development Tribunal, established in 
terms of the interim law, the Development Facilitation Act. The City of Johannesburg, 
‘authorised’ as it was in terms of the applicable provincial ordinance to take land use 
management decisions, had taken issue with the Gauteng Development Tribunal also 
taking land use management decisions in its jurisdiction. It argued that this 
compromised its effort to effectively plan for city infrastructure and service delivery. 
These powers fall within the City’s constitutional power over “municipal planning”, so 
the argument went. Provincial governments should not be doing the same as 
municipalities. The Court agreed with the City of Johannesburg and struck down those 
parts of the Development Facilitation Act that established and empowered the provincial 
tribunals to take land use management decisions. This was a victory for municipal 
autonomy and provided direction to the stalled law reform efforts. It cast doubt over 
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the strong role hitherto played by provinces in land use planning matters. The Court 
was also clear that there was a need for far-reaching law reform and effectively gave 
the national government two years within which to do this, setting a deadline of mid-
2012. 
 
The second judgment was handed down in 2012 and built on the precedent set by the 
Gauteng Development Tribunal judgment. In MEC for Local Government, 
Environmental Affairs and Development Planning, Western Cape Province In re: 
Minister for Mineral Resources and Swartl and Municipality and Others and 
Maccsand (Pty) Ltd and The City of Cape Town and Others [2012] ZACC 10, the 
setting was the City of Cape Town and the dispute was triggered by Maccsands, a 
mining company. Maccsands had obtained a mining license from the national 
government to mine for sand in a residential area on the outskirts of Cape Town. The 
question was whether Maccsands’ national mining license obviated the need for the 
City of Cape Town’s approval to change the permitted use of the site in Mitchell’s 
Plain. Maccsands, supported by the national Minister of Minerals and Energy argued 
that the granting of a mining license trumps municipal authority over “municipal 
planning”: otherwise national government’s exclusive authority over mining would be 
usurped by the municipality. The Court dismissed this argument and made it clear that 
possession of a national mining license does not mean that town planning approvals 
suddenly become unnecessary. Maccsands was again a victory for municipal 
autonomy and became an important marker in the development of the planning 
framework. 
 
In the third case, Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and 
Development Planning of the Western Cape v Lagoon Bay Lifestyle Estate (Pty) Ltd and 
Others, 2014 (2) BCLR 182 (CC), the dispute revolved around a development in George 
Municipality, a coastal town in the Western Cape. The planned development included 
two golf courses, a hotel, a private park and a gated residential community. It was, by 
all accounts, controversial and its impact stretched far beyond the boundaries of George. 
The central question was this: who decides land use management applications, such as 
rezoning and subdivision, with respect to such large developments that are ‘bigger than 
the municipality’? Can the municipality still decide autonomously or should the 
provincial government have the power to veto the municipal decision? The provincial 
government argued that the decision had an impact far beyond the area of the 
municipality and that it therefore had the power to veto the municipality’s decision. The 
developer, on the other hand, argued on the basis of the Gauteng Development Tribunal, 
that only municipalities may decide on rezoning and subdivision. The Constitutional 
Court agreed with the developer and made it clear that the municipality will always be 
the decision maker when it comes to applications for rezoning and subdivision. No 
matter how big the development and no matter what its effects across municipal 
boundaries are, the municipality decides the application for rezoning, subdivision. For 
the third time in a row, municipal power over planning authority was successfully 
asserted in the Constitutional Court. 
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Number four of the quintet of Constitutional Court judgments on municipal powers 
in land use planning is Habitat Council and Another v Provincial Minister of Local 
Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning, Western Cape and 
Others [2013] ZAWCHC 112. It dealt with the power of provincial governments to set 
aside municipal planning decisions on appeal. An important feature of the four 
provincial ordinances, carried forward into the new dispensation was that persons 
aggrieved by a land use control decision taken by a municipality, may appeal to the 
provincial executive. The provincial executive may then decide to set aside the decision 
and replace it with a provincial decision. While the provincial governments saw it as a 
necessary corrective on errant decision making by municipalities, the cities saw this as 
provincial tutelage. The Court agreed with the cities and held that the appeal system was 
unconstitutional as it intruded on the autonomy of municipalities. The provincial 
government had urged the Constitutional Court to retain the provincial appeal authority 
in cases where the development had impact beyond the municipality’s boundary. 
Without the provincial executive ‘surveillance’, the provincial government would be 
powerless to stop big decisions with extra-municipal effects, so it argued. The Court 
disagreed and reiterated that no matter how big the development, provinces must use 
powers of their own to stop the undesirable ones instead of relying on a power to reverse 
municipal decisions. 
 
The most recent judgment of Constitutional Court in Tronox KZN Sands (Pty) Ltd v 
KwaZulu-Natal Planning and Development Appeal Tribunal and Others [2016] ZACC 
1, builds on the Habitat Council judgment and also deals with the provincial appeals. 
KwaZulu-Natal, one of South Africa’s nine provinces operated in terms of a provincial 
law that made provision for appeals against municipal decisions. However, the appeal 
body was not the provincial executive but a quasi-independent body. Whilst it was 
appointed by the provincial executive, it was staffed by experts and took its 
decisions free of provincial control. This should insulate the appeal construction from 
the accusation of provincial interference, so the argument of KwaZulu-Natal went. The 
Constitutional Court was unconvinced, however, and ruled that the alleged 
independence of the provincial tribunals did prevent them from being unconstitutional. 
 
After more than a decade of indecision, the national government was thus confronted 
with no fewer than five Constitutional Court decisions that establish a firm and 
consistent trend on municipal powers. The first judgment in Gauteng Development 
Tribunal had already forced government to end a decade of prevarication around the 
issue of devolving planning authority to local government. 
 
Before examining the impact of this court-driven transformation of the planning 
framework, it is important to point out the role of South Africa’s largest cities in this. 
The Gauteng Development Tribunal case was pursued by the City of Johannesburg that 
saw provincial planning tribunals frustrate its development planning. The Maccsands 
case was pursued by South African’s second largest city, the City of Cape Town, which 
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saw its land use management powers interfered with by a national department issuing 
‘sovereign’ mining licenses. In the Habitat Council matter, it was again the City of Cape 
Town defending its right to be freed from provincial tutelage while in the Tronox matter, 
the eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality was at the forefront. The Lagoon Bay matter 
was the only one triggered by a smaller municipality, George Local Municipality. 
However, it is worth noting that this municipality presides over one of the country’s 
fastest growing economies. The charge against national and provincial interference in 
municipal planning powers was thus not led by small, maverick towns presided over by 
overly confident political leaders. Instead, it was led by the country’s largest cities, led 
by political leaders who appreciate the risks of litigating against national and provincial 
governments. After weighing these risks against the prospect of greater ability to steer 
infrastructure development and the roll-out of service delivery, they chose to assert their 
constitutional powers and emerged victoriously on four successive occasions. 
 
New Planning Legislation 
The Gauteng Development Tribunal judgment put the national government on notice to 
finalise the national planning legislation. The other four judgments further emphasised 
and confirmed that this planning legislation needed to put local governments centre stage 
and that the provincial government’s stronghold over land use management powers had 
ended. 
 
In 2013, the national government passed the Spatial Planning and Land Use 
Management Act 16 of 2013 (SPLUMA). This Act provides a national framework for 
spatial planning and land use management. It instructs national government to adopt 
a National Spatial Development Framework with a national spatial vision. It instructs 
each provincial government to adopt a Provincial Spatial Development Framework 
with a provincial spatial vision. Finally, it instructs each municipality to adopt a 
Municipal Spatial Development Framework with a municipal spatial vision. Each of 
these three levels of forward planning documents is adopted by the executive 
authority in that specific sphere. While the Act instructs collaboration between 
spheres of government, no sphere is to tell the other sphere what the content of 
their spatial development framework ought to be. 
 
On the land use management side, the Act makes it very clear that municipalities now 
receive, consider and decide all land development applications. Each municipality is 
expected to establish a Municipal Planning Tribunal that operates independently from 
local politics and is populated by municipal officials and outside experts. These tribunals 
will be the authorities of first instance in all land use development applications. In 
addition, municipal executives (i.e. mayors or executive committees) will have to sit in 
judgment on appeals against decisions of the Municipal Planning Tribunal. In a limited 
number of circumstances, the national government will seek to play a role in decision 
making on specific land development application. However, its role will be in addition 
to, not instead of, the municipal role. 
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There is no doubt that this is a fundamental change to the land use planning 
framework and it is occasioning a large scale devolution programme. Municipalities will 
now be at the forefront of land use planning and will thus have to deal with a range of 
new responsibilities and challenges. A few are outlined below. 
 
First, each municipality must now adopt a land use scheme for their entire 
municipal jurisdiction, i.e. each piece of land in the municipality must be allocated a 
‘zoning’ that indicates what the land may be used for. Large parts of the country do not 
fall under any land use scheme as land use is unregulated or regulated by traditional 
institutions. For municipalities that used to rely on provincial governments taking land 
use decisions, this will be a tremendous task, for which the Act provides a five-year 
timeframe. 
 
Secondly, each municipality must now ensure that town planning decisions, i.e. 
decisions to alter the permitted use of land, are insulated from corruption. The alteration 
of permitted land uses may instantaneously enhance the value of land and it is thus a 
decision-making power that is vulnerable to corruption wherever it is exercised. 
Municipalities, as the custodians of this responsibility will thus have to guard against 
undue influence. 
 
Thirdly, each municipality must design and adopt a municipal planning by-law. This 
by-law must regulate issues such as the application procedures, zoning categories, 
public participation on development applications, timeframes for applications, appeal 
procedures etc. Before the SPLUMA era, these matters were all regulated in provincial 
laws. Those municipalities that were authorized to perform land use management 
functions implemented provincial laws but did not make law. For those municipalities 
that were not authorized to perform town planning functions, they were essentially 
irrelevant as implementation took place at a provincial level. This situation will now 
change with all municipalities being expected to adopt laws to regulate town planning. 
 
Fourthly, development management decision-making is more than the mere granting or 
refusal of approval for a development project. Attendant to most of those approvals 
are complicated and technical decisions such as the imposition of conditions to 
safeguard municipal interests, the calculation of development levies to recoup bulk 
infrastructure investments needed to support the new development and a range of other 
important considerations. Inadequate decision-making in this area can have 
disastrous consequences for municipal infrastructure and result in, for example, the 
collapse of bulk sewerage systems, problems with water provision, electricity provision 
etc. 
 
The above four matters are but a few examples of the complexities that the 
devolution of planning powers transfers to local government. It is clear that the 
devolution of planning authority to local government will have a significant impact on 
local government’s orientation and capacity needs. This is particularly pertinent in those 
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areas where municipalities were hitherto not authorized to perform development 
management functions. It will require an injection of technical skills, particularly with 
regard to town planning, engineering and infrastructure financing into local government. 
In addition, it requires political systems that are sufficiently robust to take adequate 
planning decisions. 
 
The next section discusses the advantages and disadvantages of the manner in which 
the planning framework has been transformed. It focuses in particular on the impact 
of the transformation on local government and the role of the Constitutional Court in 
making the transformation happen. 
 
Assessing the Court-Driven Devolution of Planning 
Conventional wisdom in matters related to decentralization has it that it is unwise to 
devolve powers to a level of government that does not have the capacity to exercise 
those powers. While this conventional wisdom can be debated, there is no gainsaying 
the value of nurturing the nexus between the capabilities of a local government and its 
responsibilities. 
 
In protecting local government’s autonomy over municipal planning, none of the above-
mentioned five Constitutional Court judgments considered or made reference to the 
serious capability problems in local government or questioned whether the local 
government sphere was capable of absorbing these fundamental changes. This is 
undoubtedly correct from a legal and constitutional point of view. The enquiry in the 
Constitutional Court was confined to legal and constitutional principle. The Court could 
not be expected to base its judgment on the availability of resources in local government 
or on the capacity of municipalities to absorb the correction of what clearly was an 
unconstitutional situation. This was not a case of government assigning additional 
powers to local government, in which case the capacity issue enters the legal debate. 
This was a case of provincial governments unconstitutionally exercising powers which 
the Constitution itself reserves for local government. Besides, the Constitution provides 
very clearly in sections 154(1) and 155(6) that national and provincial governments must 
supervise, support and strengthen local government, a provision that can be easily 
invoked to counter legal arguments that the devolution will overwhelm local 
government. 
 
It is important, though, to reiterate the point made earlier that all of the five cases were 
brought by large cities. The enquiry in the Constitutional Court was led by the 
arguments of well-endowed and relatively well-functioning municipalities that were 
chomping at the bit. These large cities knew that they were going to be able to deal with 
the challenges devolution was going to bring. The Court was not furnished with the 
perspective of the struggling rural municipality that has never dealt with land use 
applications before and for whom a new set of responsibilities, constitutional or not, is 
the last thing it needs. Even among those municipalities that were exercising land use 
management responsibilities, significant problems have been recorded. For example, 
http://repository.uwc.ac.za
14 
 
Abrahams and Berrisford (2012: 29) indicate that “systems for internal management of 
the allocation of land use and development rights have collapsed in numerous 
municipalities which gravely undermines municipal capacity to undertake even basic 
urban management tasks”. 
 
The exchange of arguments between the Western Cape provincial government and 
the Court in Habitat Council clearly indicates the Court’s approach. The provincial 
government, clearly concerned with the unintended consequences of large-scale 
devolution to a struggling local government sector, pleaded with the Constitutional 
Court to save its oversight powers in the form of the provincial appeal power. This power 
would enable the province, so the argument went, to avoid that “parochial municipal 
interests will triumph”. In other words, the provincial government was concerned about 
two things. First, it was concerned that municipalities would insufficiently consider the 
regional impact of their decisions. The second concern is more implicit, namely that 
municipalities do not necessarily possess the necessary governance capabilities to take 
adequate decisions. This argument may not be entirely unfounded when viewed against 
the backdrop of the governance problems in municipalities and the risk of town 
planning decisions attracting undue influence by wealthy developers. However, the 
Court responded tersely to the provincial government’s plea by stating that the 
Constitution precisely intends for those “parochial interests” to prevail in subdivision 
and zoning decisions “subject only to the oversight and support role of national and 
provincial government, and to the planning powers vested in them”. In other words, 
the Constitutional Court showed little sympathy for the provincial fears that municipal 
decision-making would be led by parochial interests and instructed it to look for other 
mechanisms to exercise oversight instead of insisting on exercising appeal powers. 
 
The Constitutional Court’s decisions not only shaped but also accelerated the 
devolution. Yet, the narrative of the court-led devolution of land use planning powers in 
South Africa does beg the question whether this was in all respects the best mechanism 
for ushering in change. In the Gauteng Development Tribunal judgment, the 
Constitutional Court was confronted with a fragmented legislative framework for land 
use management,  much of which predated the democratic order and a government 
seemingly unable to break the impasse. Clearly annoyed with government’s inability to 
address this issue legislatively over a period of more than 15 years, the Court let out an 
exasperated comment: “This situation cries out for legislative reform” (Gauteng 
Development Tribunal 2010 at para 31). 
 
None of the four judgments, in any measure of detail, dealt with information 
pertaining to the ability of local governments, particularly the weaker local authorities, 
to absorb such fundamental change. The end result is that, on the back of the 
argument by the well-endowed cities in the Constitutional Court, small impoverished 
rural municipalities  must  now  establish  land  use  management  systems  in  great  
haste  to perform a function that they have never performed in the past. National and 
provincial governments are now forced to design a creative solution in form of the 
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joint exercise of planning functions by groupings of municipalities and in the form of 
the deployment of provincial resources to assist municipalities. 
 
It is suggested that this does not mean that the Constitutional Court overstepped its 
boundaries or that it would have been better if the Court was never approached with 
these matters. As argued above, the intervention was far overdue. The judgments ended 
the impasse caused by the national government’s inability to deal with the vexed issue 
as to who is supposed to perform what land use planning function. If the Courts had not 
been approached, the paralysis may very well have continued much longer. 
 
The question should rather be: what would have happened if the national government 
had acted earlier to reform the sector with a new law? What would have happened if 
either a national or provincial legislature would have applied its mind and adopt a 
devolution scheme and this was challenged in court? Would the Court have taken the 
same stern position if it had been confronted with an earnest attempt by a legislature to 
carefully devolve powers to local government instead of with an argument to preserve 
old order laws? It is submitted that the Court would have shown more deference to an 
earnest attempt by Parliament to regulate devolution than it did to the argument that 
the old order laws should be preserved. It may even be argued that the Court may have 
been sympathetic towards a devolution programme that was more measured and 
careful than the current SPLUMA if the county’s legislatures had applied their mind 
and not taken 15 years to do so. Of course, that argument is moot and irrelevant for 
the new South African context. The judgments are part of history and they spawned 
a new national framework for land use management in which local government takes 
centre stage. 
 
However, it is submitted that the argument is relevant for other countries, faced with 
similar questions. This is particularly so, given that more and more countries are 
choosing to enhance their decentralization laws or even entrench the role of local 
government constitutionally. For example, Tunisia’s 2014 Constitution provides for the 
entrenchment of local government and Zimbabwe’s 2013 Constitution also strengthens 
the position of local government. It is not unlikely that the judiciary in these countries, 
and other countries that are enhancing the status of subnational governments, will 
be asked to rule on devolution issues. The South African experience with the devolution 
of planning suggests that national governments, faced with constitutional provisions 
that demand devolution, are well advised to avoid great delays in implementing such 
provisions. Once the judiciary is asked to resolve disputes pertaining to the location of 
constitutional powers, the considerations are necessarily narrowed to legal ones and 
government may be deprived of opportunities to manage the devolution carefully with 
due consideration to all the interests at stake. 
 
Conclusion 
The South African case shows that courts can play a pivotal role in providing clarity in 
what may seem like intractable disagreements surrounding devolution. Had it not been 
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for the four Constitutional Court judgments, the South African planning sector would 
perhaps still be wondering who is supposed to do what, an untenable position given the 
importance of this function for service delivery purposes. 
 
However, the South African case also shows that ‘devolution by court injunction’ is 
necessarily unpolished. Litigation is not the ideal platform for crafting nuanced 
devolution schemes that consider the interests of all municipalities in a scenario that is 
highly uneven in terms of local capabilities. While this article seeks to take nothing away 
from the value of constitutional protection of local government powers, it points towards 
the need for devolution to be promoted, regulated and guided in legislation. If 
legislatures forsake their duty to promote, regulate and guide devolution the courts may 
step in and do it for them. Given the increasing number of countries on the continent 
that are considering or implementing various forms of devolution or decentralization 
with a greater role for the courts, the South African experience contains an important 
lesson. 
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